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State Appellate Public Defender
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BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DERRICK C. MILES,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 42569
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2014-3684
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Derrick Miles appeals, contending the district court imposed an excessive
underlying sentence on him. The State’s primary argument in response is that this
Court should dismiss his appeal based on the fugitive dismissal rule. That argument is
mistaken for several reasons.
First, as Idaho Supreme Court has noted, fugitive status alone is not sufficient to
justify the dismissal of an appeal, particularly where the defendant’s absence does not
change the relevant facts or legal analysis of the issues on appeal. That is the case
here. Additionally, the question of whether this appeal should be dismissed has already
been addressed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order to conditionally dismiss the
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appeal, which was resolved in Mr. Miles’ favor. The State offered no argument in that
regard, and so, re-litigating that issue, in the briefs or otherwise, is inappropriate.
Furthermore, the State could not meet its burden to show dismissal is appropriate
based on the proper appellate record in this case, and its motion to augment the record
with documents not considered by the district court, as those documents were created
after the relevant events, was improvidently granted. For all those reasons, this Court
should not dismiss Mr. Miles’ appeal.
On the merits, this Court should grant relief because the record shows Mr. Miles’
sentence is excessive.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Miles’ Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an underlying sentence
which exceeded even the prosecutor’s sentence recommendation and is excessive
given any reasonable view of the facts.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Underlying Sentence Which
Exceeded Even The Prosecutor’s Sentence Recommendation And Is Excessive Given
Any Reasonable View Of The Facts
A.

This Court Should Not Dismiss Mr. Miles’ Appeal
The State’s argument for dismissal of Mr. Miles’ appeal fails for several reasons.

First, while it is within the scope of this Court’s discretion to dismiss a case pursuant to
the fugitive dismissal rule, according to the Idaho Supreme Court, “the defendant’s
fugitive status alone was not enough to warrant dismissal.” State v. Nath, 137 Idaho
712, 718 (2002) (citing Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234 (1993)). The
reason for that rule, the Idaho Supreme Court explained, is: “Regardless of the flight,
the appellate issues remained the same. This Court can decide them as well following
the flight as before.”1 Id. As the State’s argument for dismissal is based solely on
Mr. Miles’ fugitive status (see Resp. Br., pp.4-5), its argument fails under Nath.
Apparently recognizing this problem, the State tries to distinguish Nath on the
basis that the defendant in that case had been rearrested by the time of the appeal.
(Resp. Br., p.5 n.3.) That argument is inconsistent with the plain language of the Nath
decision: “This Court can decide [the issues on appeal] as well following the flight as
before.” Nath, 137 Idaho at 718 (emphasis added). The Nath Court also explained

The Idaho Supreme Court did note, “[i]n dicta, the [United States Supreme] Court said
that a long escape might delay the proceedings enough to dismiss.” Nath, 137 Idaho at
718 (citing Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 249). However, in Nath, the defendant had
been absent for three years, and that was not enough to justify dismissing his appeal.
Id. Mr. Miles was present for the sentencing hearing held on September 2, 2014.
(R., p.51.) Therefore, as of the filing of this brief, he cannot have been absent for longer
than the defendant in Nath, and so, like Nath, the length of his absence does not justify
dismissing his appeal.

1
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that, while the primary challenge in that case was to the district court’s jurisdiction,
“[t]hat court had ample powers to remedy the wrong that occurred, including
consideration of the conduct in imposing sentence.” Nath, 137 Idaho at 718. As in
Nath, Mr. Miles’ absence can be addressed by the district court when it addresses the
pending motion for probation violation. Therefore, as in Nath, the relevant facts and
legal analysis on the issues raised in this appeal (i.e., Mr. Miles’ challenge to the initial
imposition of sentence) remain the same regardless of whether it considers those
issues before, during, or after Mr. Miles’ absence. As such, the State’s attempt to
distinguish Nath based on whether the defendant has been rearrested is mistaken
because that fact is irrelevant to the analysis under Nath.
Furthermore, the procedural history of this case demonstrates that the State had
the opportunity to raise these concerns prior to the briefing, but chose not to.

Cf.

State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 63-64 (2015) (explaining why re-litigation of issues
previously decided in another action between the same litigants should be precluded).
Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an order conditionally dismissing
Mr. Miles’ appeal because “[t]his appeal has been suspended since December 29,
2015, [sic] for the probation violation proceeding, and there appears not to have been
any action in the District Court regarding this matter.” (Order Conditionally Dismissing
Appeal, dated February 24, 2016.) As such, the Court indicated “the case should be
dismissed, and a new Notice of Appeal could be filed upon resolution of the pending
probation violation matter.” (Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal.) The Court also
explained that the appeal would be dismissed “within fourteen (14) days unless a
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response is filed showing why this appeal should not be dismissed.”

(Order

Conditionally Dismissing Appeal.)
Mr. Miles filed a response to that order, explaining such a dismissal would
deprive him of the ability to challenge the district court’s actions at the initial sentencing
hearing. (Objection to Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal and Motion to Resume
the Briefing Schedule, pp.1-2, file-stamped Feb. 26, 2016).)

The State filed no

argument in regard to the order or Mr. Miles’ response. And yet, the State now seeks to
have Mr. Miles’ appeal dismissed on essentially the same basis as the order
conditionally dismissing the appeal:

“[h]e subsequently failed to appear for his

probation violation evidentiary hearing . . . .” (Resp. Br., p.3.) Given the particular
procedural history of this case, it is inappropriate for the State to raise that issue now, in
its Respondent’s Brief or otherwise.
B.

The State’s Motion To Augment The Record Was Improvidently Granted; A
Review Of The Proper Record On Appeal Reaffirms That This Court Should Not
Dismiss Mr. Miles’ Appeal
The State’s argument for dismissal also fails because the proper record on

appeal – namely, the documents considered by, and the arguments made to, the district
court – does not indicate when or whether Mr. Miles failed to appear. (See generally R.)
That is unsurprising, since this appeal is only dealing with the district court’s decisions
at the initial sentencing hearing, which occurred before any such absence allegedly
occurred.

(See, e.g., R., p.51 (indicating Mr. Miles personally appeared at the

sentencing hearing).) As the party seeking dismissal of the appeal, the State bears the
burden of showing dismissal is appropriate. Since the record does not contain any
information about Mr. Miles’ absence, the State’s argument in its Respondent’s Brief
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fails to show that dismissal is appropriate in this case. Cf. Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho
430, 434 n.1 (2002) (noting that some portions of the respondent’s cross appeal were
based only on documents which were not in the appellate record, and holding those
arguments would not be considered pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b)(6)). As such, its argument
for dismissal should be rejected based on the proper appellate record. State v. MoranSoto, 150 Idaho 175, 179 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that, where the record was
insufficient to determine whether the defendant in that case was actually a fugitive who
should be disentitled to his appeal, the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal would be
denied).
The State’s inability to prove its argument given the proper appellate record
demonstrates one reason why the Idaho Appellate Rules have specific provisions for
the filing of a separate motion to dismiss an appeal. See I.A.R. 32(a); compare MoranSoto, 150 Idaho at 179.

One of those provisions allows for such motions to be

accompanied by briefs or affidavits in support thereof. I.A.R. 32(d). However, the State
has not filed such a motion in this case.2
Rather than pursuing the path provided in the appellate rules, the State instead
moved to augment the record with, or have this Court take judicial notice of, certain
documents which it asserted would justify its argument for dismissal. (Resp. Br., p.3;
Motion to Augment the Appellate Record or, in the Alternative, Motion to Take Judicial
Notice, and Statement in Support Thereof, file-stamped May 9, 2016).) That motion
was improvidently granted. (Order Granting Motion to Augment, dated May 23 2016.)
There are limits on when motions to dismiss may be filed. See, e.g., I.A.R. 32(a). As
discussed in depth in Section A, supra, the State had the opportunity to raise its
arguments in favor of dismissal pursuant to the order conditionally dismissing the
appeal, but did not.
2
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The Idaho Supreme Court has authority to review whether it erred in ruling on a motion
to augment the appellate record.3 State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 218 (2014).
As Mr. Miles explained in his objection to that motion (file-stamped May 12,
2016), the State’s motion was improper because it sought to augment the record with
irrelevant information which had not been considered by the district court. The Idaho
Supreme Court has previously explained that documents which were not considered by
the district court, particularly those which were not created until after the appeal was
filed, “obviously . . . could not have been presented to the district court and could not
have been included in the record had the Bank made a timely motion to augment the
record.” See, e.g., Western Community Ins. Co. v. Kickers, Inc., 137 Idaho 305, 306 n.1
(2002) (emphasis added).
Yet that is precisely the type of documents the State’s motion sought to augment
into the appellate record – documents which had not been considered by the district
court because the documents had not been created until after the district court’s
decision. Both of the documents the State asked to be augmented to the record were
created on May 9, 2016 (see, e.g., Aug. p.2 (bottom right hand corner bearing the date
the document was printed); Aug. p.8 (same).) Furthermore, the information it asks this
Mr. Miles appreciates the limitations which would exist in reviewing the order granting
the motion to augment should this case be assigned to the Court of Appeals. See, e.g.,
State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793, 795-97 (Ct. App. 2013). However, even if that
Court cannot address the propriety of the order augmenting the record, it should still,
pursuant to its decision in State v. Morgan, consider only the documents before the
district court in analyzing this case: “The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying
the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements
of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which
are properly made part of the record on appeal.” State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621
(Ct. App. 2012). Accordingly, it should not consider the elements of the record which
were not before the district court, such as the documents in the State’s motion to
augment.
3
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Court to consider is that Mr. Miles failed to appear for a hearing on December 3, 2014.
(Resp. Br., p.3.) However, the sentencing hearing at issue in this appeal occurred on
September 2, 2014.

(R., p.48.)

The Judgment of Conviction was entered on

September 15, 2014, and Mr. Miles subsequently filed his Notice of Appeal on
September 26, 2014. (R., pp.51, 54.) Therefore, those documents were created after
the district court made the decision challenged on appeal, and even the purportedlyrelevant information therein did not occur until after the events relevant to this appeal
were concluded. As such, those documents were not properly included in the record
pursuant to a motion to augment the record. Kickers, 137 Idaho at 306 n.1.
As a result, the State’s motion to augment the record was improvidently granted,
and a review of the proper appellate record reaffirms that dismissing Mr. Miles’ appeal is
not proper in this case.
C.

The Record Shows The Sentence Imposed Is Excessive
The State’s responses concerning the merits of Mr. Miles’ argument that his

sentence is excessive are not remarkable, and as such, no further reply is necessary in
that regard. Accordingly, Mr. Miles simply refers the Court back to pages 4-5 of his
Appellant’s Brief.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Miles respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 21st day of June, 2016.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of June, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
DERRICK C MILES
9181 W COREY LN
BOISE ID 83705
GEORGE A SOUTHWORTH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
RYAN DOWELL
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF

__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
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